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COMMENTS
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION'S
DECEPTION ENFORCEMENT POLICY
In 1983, the Federal Trade Commission (the Commission),' under the
direction of Chairman James C. Miller III,2 announced an enforcement
policy to protect consumers against deceptive acts and practices in advertis-
ing. The Commission's Deception Enforcement Policy (the Policy), which
includes a reformulated definition of deception, 3 has generated considerable
1. The Federal Trade Commission was established under the authority of the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914 (FTC Act), ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1982)). The Commission was established to help the Department of Justice
enforce the Sherman and Clayton Acts, and to proscribe deceptive practices that were not
covered by those acts. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948). The Commission has authority
to proscribe "deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). In
1975, Congress amended the FTC Act by replacing "in commerce" with "in or affecting
commerce." Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-637, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 2193, 2193-203 (codified at 15 U.S.C § 45(a)(1) (1982)). This
amendment broadened the Commission's regulatory authority by granting it jurisdiction over
intrastate matters that affect interstate commerce. For a discussion of the legislative history of
the FTC Act, see Note, The Limits of FTC Power to Issue Consumer Protection Orders, 40
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 496, 505-09 (1972), and Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1019-21 (1967).
The Commission is authorized to enforce certain federal statutes aimed at consumer
protection. See, e.g., Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 70-70K (1982)(protecting producers and consumers against misbranding and false advertising of the fiber
content of textile products); Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (1982)(requiring that packages be labelled to provide accurate information about quantity and con-
tents); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693s (1982) (requiring lending institutions to
disclose details of loan procedure and reasons for rejecting applications); Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982) (regu-
lating consumer product warranties); Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C.§§ 1311-1314 (1982) (enabling the Attorney General or the Department of Justice to enforce
antitrust laws).
2. James C. Miller III was appointed to the Commission on June 26, 1981 by President
Reagan. At the time, Miller was the head of the regulatory policy branch of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), and was also executive director of the cabinet-level task force
on regulatory relief. Wall St. J., June 29, 1981, at 12, col. 2. Miller was appointed to succeed
Commissioner Paul Rand Dixon, who retired in September, 1981. Miller's appointment was
approved by the Senate, 97-2, on September 21, 1981. Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1981, at 2, col.
3.
3. The reformulated definition of a deceptive act or practice states: "The Commission will
find deception if there is a misrepresentation, omission, or other practice, that is likely to
mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment."
Federal Trade Commission Enforcement Policy letter to Representative John D. Dingell,
Chairman, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,455, at
56,072 (Oct. 31, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Policy]. According to Commissioners Bailey and
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controversy. Since the Policy was not adopted through established admin-
istrative agency rulemaking4 or adjudicative5 proceedings, the public never
had a chance to participate in its creation. The Policy also does not accurately
restate prior case law on deception. 6 Despite these defects, however, the
Policy has already begun to reshape the law of deception in consumer
advertising.'
This Comment analyzes the Commission's Policy and explores its impact
on FTC proceedings. Part I examines the evolution of the Commission's
deception standard as a frame of reference for a critique of Chairman
Miller's Policy, and discusses the Commission's authority to enforce the
deception policy through adjudication and rulemaking. Part II analyzes the
current Policy and its departure from prior case law on deception in adver-
tising. Finally, Part III discusses the Policy's ramifications on the Commis-
sion's enforcement efforts against deceptive practices, based upon four
Commission cases decided under the new Policy.
I. THE COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
A. Evolution of the Commission's Advertising Deception Policy
The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act),' which authorizes the
Commission's existence, has gradually developed from its origins as an anti-
monopoly law into a full-blown consumer protection statute. When the FTC
Act was adopted in 1914, it barred only those acts and practices of advertisers
that allegedly had adverse effects on competition. 9 The Act did not proscribe
Pertschuk, the dissenters against the Policy statement, the previous deception standard provided
"that an act or practice is deceptive if (I) it has the tendency or capacity to mislead (2) a
substantial number of consumers (3) in a material way." Bailey & Pertschuk, The Law of
Deception: The Past as Prologue, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 849, 850 (1984) (examines the Policy as
a device to narrow traditional Commission deception authority).
The Policy letter was written by Chairman Miller at the request of Representative Dingell,
who wanted to resolve some doubts that the Committee members had about the law of deception.
H.R. REP. No. 156, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983). Representative Dingell responded to the
letter by rejecting its findings. Letter from Representative John D. Dingell to Chairman James
C. Miller 111, 5 TRADE REG.. REP. (CCH) 50,455, at 56,086 (Oct. 31, 1983). In his letter to
Chairman Miller, Dingell stated in part:
We requested a disciplined, in-depth review of what decades of case law stand for,
and of the nature and amount of evidence of deception considered by the Com-
mission during fifty years of litigation in the public interest. What you delivered is
a document that addresses not what the Commission's deception jurisdiction is, but
what some now at the agency want it to be.
Id. Although Chairman Dingell requested a more responsive reply to his initial inquiry, the full
Commission has yet to provide one.
4. See infra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
6. See generally infra notes 97-172 and accompanying text (tracing distinctions between
old deception law and Policy restatement).
7. See infra notes 173-216 and accompanying text.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1982).
9. Id. at § 45 ("unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful");
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deceptive acts or practices,' 0 and did not recognize or extend direct protection
to consumers against deceptive acts." The 1938 Wheeler-Lea Act 2 broadened
the FTC Act, principally by adding new sections aimed at consumer protec-
tion. Amendments to section five of the Act gave the Commission authority
to prohibit deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. 3 Amend-
ments to section twelve also gave the Commission authority to prohibit
see, e.g., FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934) (sellers of lumber products may not
name product "California White Pine" because the wood used by these companies was yellow
pine); FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216 (1933) (trade name "Milling Co." is per
se unfair method of competition because it induced purchasers to believe that respondent
engaged in milling of products). For a more detailed discussion of early FTC court cases, see
G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMiSSION (1968) (discussing FTC cases involving
misbranding and mislabeling), Thompson, Highlights in the Evolution of the Federal Trade
Commission, 8 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 257, 265-67 (1940) (discussing effect of court decisions on
role of commission), and Note, Unfair Competition at Common Law and Under the Federal
Trade Commission, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 331-33 (1920) (describing reactions of federal
courts to Commission regulation). See generally Handler, False and Misleading Advertising, 39
YALE L.J. 22 (1929) (discussing various civil and criminal devices available for consumer
protection against false and misleading advertising).
10. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 310, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982)).
II. The term "consumers" refers to retail customers as well as-corporations, partnerships,
and employees. See, e.g., Universal Credit Acceptance Corp., 82 F.T.C. 570, 643 (1973)
(commercial buyers of services and franchises are "consumers"), rev'd in part on other grounds
sub nom. Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974); American Mktg. Assoc., Inc., 73
F.T.C. 213, 253-54 (1968) (prospective employees of corporation are "consumers"); Disclosure
Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 16
C.F.R. § 436.2(b) (1985) (protecting any individual, group, association, general partnership,
corporation, or other business entity).
12. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. III (currently codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. (1982)). The legislative history of the Wheeler-Lea Act is compiled in C. DUNN,
WHEELER-LEA ACT (1938).
13. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111-14 (amended 1975). Section 5
of the FTC Act formerly read: "deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are hereby
declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45. The amendment to § 5 was designed to overrule a Supreme
Court decision that prevented the FTC from prohibiting deceptive acts or practices. FTC v.
Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931); see, e.g., Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. v. FTC,
122 F.2d 158, 160-61 (3d Cir. 1941) (Wheeler-Lea Act intended to remove procedural requirement
imposed by Raladam). A subsequent amendment to § 5 changed "in commerce" to "in or
affecting commerce." See supra note 1.
The FTC Act's proscription against deception is based upon the belief that deceptive acts
or practices have the following harmful effects: 1) injury to competition, see FTC v. Raladam
Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1931) (paramount aim of FTC Act is protection of public from
evils likely to result from destruction or restriction of competition); 2) injury to consumers, see
FTC v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 191 F.2d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 1951) (claim of a miracle cure for
arthritis and rheumatism could have adverse consequences on consumers because such claims
could cause consumers to forego alternative proven methods of treatment); 3) injury to
advertising as a source of information, see Beneficial Corporation v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 618-
19 (3d Cir. 1976) (claim of an "instant tax refund" constituted an erroneous representation
because it was a loan secured by the consumer's tax refund rather than a direct refund), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
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deceptive acts performed by advertisers against consumers. 4 The Wheeler-
Lea amendments measurably broadened the authority and responsibility of
the Commission, as evidenced by Congress' decision to leave the term
"deceptive act or practice" to be defined by the Commission itself. 5 Since
1938, the definition of deception has evolved through the Commission's
case-by-case adjudication of allegedly misleading advertisements.' 6
In practice, the Commission has followed four steps in its investigations
of deceptive claims. First, the challenged advertisement must make some
kind of representation. To be deceptive, an advertisement has to make a
representation that can be proven to be deceptive. A challenged represen-
tation in an advertisement can be express 7 or implied.' 8 To determine what
14. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, ch. 49, § 4, 52 Stat. 1l1, 114 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 52
(1982)). Section 12 of the FTC Act governs the advertising of food, drug, medical devices, and
cosmetics. 15 U.S.C. §§ 52, 55. Section 12(b) of the FTC Act provides that advertisements that
violate § 12 of the Act also violate § 5. Id. § 52(b). Section 12 cases are discussed in this
Comment only as they relate to the law of deception under § 5.
15. The House and Senate Reports on the Wheeler-Lea Act do not define the term "deceptive
act or practice." See H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1937); S. REP. No. 221,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1937). The amendment to § 5 was passed by both the House and
Senate in the same form as it was introduced in the Senate in 1936. S. 3744, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess., 80 CoNG. REc. 553 (1936). See H.R. 3143, 75th Cong., Ist Sess., 81 CoNG. REC. 289
(1937); S. REP. No. 1077, 75th Cong., Ist Sess., 81 CONG. REC. 337 (1937). Debate in the
House focused on amendments to §§ 12-15 of the FTC Act, which regulate deceptive advertising
of "food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics." Id. § 12(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 52(a) (1982)). See
83 CONG. REC. 393-96 (1983) (floor debate on amendments).
The lack of a statutory definition of deception has given the Federal Trade Commission
wide discretion to apply different standards of deception. For instance, the levels of consumer
awareness and intelligence sought to be protected by the Commission has varied in different
cases. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 662 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that a
higher level of consumer intelligence was appropriate) with Gelb v. FTC, 144 F.2d 580, 582
(2d Cir. 1944) (standard of deception was based on a very low level of consumer awareness
and intelligence). See generally FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965)
(Commission has influential role in interpreting § 5 and applying it to novel cases); FTC v.
Morton Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953) (section 5 proscriptions are
flexible and have been defined with particularity in numerous cases); FTC v. R.F. Keppel &
Brother, Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 312 (1934) (Congress afforded courts flexibility to define "decep-
tion" by not rigidly defining § 5 proscriptions).
16. Some commentators nevertheless favor the creation of a statutory definition of deception.
See Note, Need for a Statutory Definition of Deceptive Advertising, 19 NEw ENG. L. REV. 127
(1983); Marx, Section 43A of the Lanham Act: A Statutory Cause of Action for False
Advertising, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 383 (1983).
17. Express representations are misleading if they are contrary to fact. See National Comm'n
on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 161 (7th Cir. 1977) (claim that linked egg consumption
to heart disease false because no such evidence existed), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978);
Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 753-56 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (claim that mouthwash
could cure or prevent colds was false), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978); Certified Bldg. Prods.,
Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1004, 1034 (1973) (claim that residential siding would reduce heating costs was
false), aff'd sub nom. Thiret v. FTC, 512 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1975).
18. See, e.g., Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 529 F.2d 1398, 1402-03 (2d Cir.) (claim was deceptive
because it implied that air conditioner performed well in extremely hot weather), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 818 (1976); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246, 248 (6th Cir.) (claim
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an advertisement represents, the Commission must analyze the overall impres-
that tire was safer than all others because it could stop quicker on all road surfaces, regardless
of road conditions, deceptive), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); National Bakers Serv., Inc.
v. FTC, 329 F.2d 365, 366-67 (7th Cir. 1964) (claim that bread had fewer calories per slice
than other brands was deceptive because bread was more thinly sliced); Mytinger & Casselberry,
Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 534, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (claim that United States officially endorsed
product was deceptive because alleged endorsement appeared in consent agreement that settled
misrepresentation charges).
Express claims about the performance or safety of a product contain implied representations
that the claims have been substantiated. If the claims are not in fact substantiated (i.e., supported
by a reasonable basis), the advertising may be found to be deceptive. See, e.g., Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246, 250-51 (6th Cir.) (performance and safety claims about
tire's stopping capabilities deceptively implied that they were substantiated by tests), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C 488, 549-50 (1973) (advertising
found deceptive where company conveyed impression to public that it had a reasonable factual
basis for making claim), aff'd as modified, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993
(1974); see also National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C 84, 191 (1976) (claim based on
inadequate or nonexistent substantiation was deceptive because it omitted highly material fact),
aff'd as modified, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
19. See also Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910). When
the Commission ascertains a representation's tendency to deceive, it focuses on the entire
representation. In the landmark case of Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d
676, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1944), the respondent represented in its advertising campaign that its skin
care product contained rejuvenating qualities for skin. The representations implied that the
product contained an element that prevented the skin's natural aging process. Since the court
found that no known external application could prevent aging of the skin, the court held that
the product's trade name, "Rejuvenescence," was deceptive in light of its denotative meaning
of that which restores youth.
Even if an ad or claim contains one or several obvious misrepresentations, it could still not
be found to be deceptive if other aspects of the ad or claim substantially correct or nearly
correct the misrepresentation(s). Express and implied representations may be qualified by
disclosures or disclaimers, although the effectiveness of the disclosure or disclaimer depends on
the net impression conveyed. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 1978)
(Commission properly found "predominant visual message" misleading when not corrected or
contradicted by accompanying verbal message); Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184, 986
(D.C. Cir. 1963) (qualifying statement may not alleviate deception if in fine print and set apart
from body of advertisement or if disclosure contributed to deception), cert. dismissed, 372 U.S.
83 (1964); Litton Indus., Inc., 97 FTC 1, 71 & n.6 (1981) (fine print disclosures inadequate to
remedy misleading statement made in headline), aff'd as modified, 676 F.2d 364 (9th Cir.
1982); see also Bantam Books, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 680, 681-82 (2d Cir. 1960) (Commission
ordered publisher to print in clear and conspicuous type on cover and title page of any abridged
book phrase indicating that book is abridged; legend in small type on bottom of cover
inadequate), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960); AMREP Corp., 102 F.T.C. 1362, 1646-47 n.47
(1983) (small print disclosure in brochure failed to dispel misrepresentations made in oral sales
presentation); Raymond Lee Org., Inc., 92 F.T.C. 489, 618-19 (1978) (ambiguous disclosures
in contracts did not counter overall impression created by prior written and oral representations),
aff'd, 679 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Peacock Buick, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1532, 1554 & n.5 (1975)
(subsequent disclosure in financing agreement that cars for sale were used did not cure prior
misrepresentation that car was new). Conversely, a single misrepresentation amidst otherwise
proper claims may render the entire representation deceptive if the significance of the single
misrepresentation taints the other claims.
By examining the representation itself, the Commission is able to determine its meaning and
assess its capacity to deceive. See Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
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sion that is projected by the advertisement 9 from the perspective of the
targeted audience. 20 These determinations become part of the administrative
record. 2'
(Commission is entitled to conclude from advertisements themselves that they had a tendency
or capacity to mislead); Niresk Indus. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337, 342 (7th Cir.) (Commission could
conclude from advertisements alone their tendency to mislead), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 883
(1960).
The Commission may occasionally require extrinsic evidence or expert testimony before
reaching a conclusion about the tendency or capacity of an act or practice to deceive. See
Leonard F. Porter, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 546, 626-27 (1976), discussed supra notes 112-22 and
accompanying text. Several law review articles have discussed the type and amount of evidence
used by the Commission when it decides deception cases. See, e.g., Barnes, The Significance
of Quantitative Evidence in Federal Trade Commission Deception Advertising Cases, 46 LAW
& CONTEMP. PRoBs. 25 (1983); Thomson, Problems of Proof in False Comparative Product
Advertising: How Gullible is the Consumer? 72 Trade-Mark Rep. 385 (1982); Comment, The
Use and Reliability Survey Evidence in Deceptive Advertising Cases, 62 OR. L. REv. 561 (1983);
Comment, FTC Deceptive Advertising Regulation-A Proposal for the Use of Consumer
Behavior Research, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 946 (1982).
20. See infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text. Some commentators urge that advertise-
ments be judged in terms of their persuasiveness as well as their content. Address by Albert
H. Kramer, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Oct. 20, 1977) (greater attention must be given to multi-sensory appeal of electronic
media; lighting, film, sound, camera lens, and angle all affect an advertisement's sensory
appeal). For a discussion of subliminal projection, see Bliss, Subliminal Projection-History &
Analysis, 5 COMMENT L.J. 419 (1983).
21. The FTC has authority to determine the existence and meaning of advertised represen-
tations. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1965). In so doing, the Com-
mission may apply its own expertise, but often relies on outside testimony and empirical
analysis. See supra note 19. Such outside aids include consumer perception surveys and the
advertiser's own copy tests. Consumer survey tests are typically of two types. The first type of
consumer surveys are those commissioned by the FTC. See MacMillan, Inc. 96 F.T.C. 208,
273 (1980) (survey of consumer response to extension school advertisement). The second type
are those surveys that are conducted by independent research groups or third parties. See Coca-
Cola Co., 83 F.T.C. 746, 770 (1973) (survey of consumer response to Hi-C advertisement).
Alternatively, the Commission may rely on an advertiser's own tests, which routinely are
conducted by marketers to measure the public's perception of advertised claims. See Warner-
Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975), aff'd as modified, 562 F.2d 749 (D:C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978); Bristol Myers Co., 85 F.T.C. 688 (1975); ITT Continental Baking
Co., 83 F.T.C. 865 (1973), modified, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976). Although these aids often
help the Commission determine the meaning of representations, they are not required to
substantiate the Commission's findings. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-
92 (1965) (Commission need not conduct survey research before determining that commercials
have a tendency to mislead); see also American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.2d 232,
236-37 (6th Cir. 1968) (customer testimony helpful but not essential), aff'd, 421 F.2d 845 (1970);
J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 890 (6th Cir. 1967) (random sample not needed for
Commission to determine meaning and impact of advertisements); Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC,
143 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1944) (Commission not required to sample public opinion).
A federal court of appeals may reverse the Commission's finding if it is not supported by
substantial evidence. 15 U.S.C. §45(c). See, e.g., Elliot Knitwear, Inc. v. FTC, 266 F.2d 787
(2d Cir. 1959) (court overturned Commission ruling that brand name "Cashmora" was deceptive
in that it inferred product was composed of cashmere wool); Allan B. Wrisley Co. v. FTC,
113 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1940) (court overturned Commission finding that consumers believed
respondent's soap contained 100% percent olive oil). Nevertheless, courts of appeals should
[Vol. 35:125
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Second, the representation must be false. The boundaries of falsity are
broader and more subtle than the parameters of what constitutes blatant
lies. 22 An advertisement can be false even if the representations are literally
true and the overall content of the advertisement is deceptive. 23 Falsity
includes the use of half-truths, ' 4 omissions,25 and ambiguities.2 6
give Commission findings considerable deference on review. FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co.,
382 U.S. 46, 4849 (1965); accord Simeon Management Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1145
(9th Cir. 1978) (FTC is more qualified to determine deception than the courts); Resort Car
Rental Sys. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1975) (Commission has expertise in assessing
deceptive claims).
22. A representation may be found deceptive if a particular phrase within the representation
is subject to more than one interpretation, and one of those interpretations is contrary to fact.
See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (claim deceptive if it
projects some false impression, notwithstanding other true impressions); FTC v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674-75 (2d Cir. 1963) (claim deceptive if it has two meanings, one of which
is false); Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1962) (claim that shoes
could relieve pain found deceptive, because claim could imply that shoes had therapeutic value
when they did not).
23. True claims are rarely deceptive. But see Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 900-01 (9th Cir.
1960) (claim that product cured bed wetting found misleading because it only worked in half
of all cases); Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc., 55 F.T.C. 1840, 1849-50 (1959) (claim that
product could stop or prevent baldness found misleading because product could have no effect
on men suffering from male pattern baldness), aff'd, 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960); see also
Guide Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 255.2
(1985) (celebrities who endorse products must actually use them, notwithstanding truth of
broadcast claims). For a discussion of the Simeon Management decision, see infra notes 55-58
and accompanying text.
24. P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950). The respondent represented that
its brand of cigarettes contained "less nicotine, or less tars and resins, or is less irritating to
the throat than the cigarettes or the smoke therefrom of any of the six other leading brands
of cigarettes." Id. at 54. The advertisement represented that the claim was based on an impartial
scientific study conducted and published by Reader's Digest magazine. Id. at 57. The Com-
mission determined that the claim implied that the respondent's brand of cigarette was a safe
product. Id. at 56. Contrary to this implication, the Reader's Digest article reported that all
cigarettes, including the respondent's, were dangerously high in tars and nicotine. Id.
25. Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Commission found that a
Chrysler advertisement was ambiguous because it implied that its eight-cylinder engine car was
"small" and fuel efficient. Id. at 363. The Administratiye Law Judge (ALJ) found that Chrysler
inaccurately reported the contents of two Popular Science magazine articles, which stated that
Chrysler's six-cylinder "small cars," Valiants and Darts, were superior in fuel economy to all
Chevrolet Novas. The Chrysler advertisements did not report that the articles covered only six-
cylinder automobiles and not Chrysler's eight-cylinder Valiants and Darts, which were not fuel
efficient. Instead, the advertisements ambiguously referred to Chrysler's lines as "small cars."
Id.
26. See, e.g., Brite Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (importers failed to
disclose foreign origin of products on front of packaging, container, or display card of products);
Kerran v. FTC, 265 F.2d 246 (10th Cir.) (labels on recycled lubricating oil containers ambiguous
because labels did not disclose use of recycled oil and containers were indistinguishable from
those containing virgin crude), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959).
In Simeon Management Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978), the respondent
advertised that its weight loss program was safe and effective. Id. at 1141. A representative
sample of one of respondent's advertisements is as follows:
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Third, a challenged advertisement must have a tendency or capacity to
deceive consumers. 27 Proof of an actual deception or consumer injury is not
required to prove deception; the mere showing of a tendency or capacity to
deceive is sufficient.28 The absence of an actual injury requirement as an
element of deception 29 exemplifies the Commission's effort to take precau-
tionary measures to prevent deception, rather than to compensate injured
Medically supervised weight loss. Lose weight safely, quickly, and effortlessly
through our proven weight reduction program developed by Medical Doctors and
supervised by our Physicians and Nurses. Simeon Weight Clinics, its Doctors,
Nurses and professionally trained staff, bring you a quick and safe way to melt
away unwanted pounds.
Id. The respondent claimed that a drug, known as human chorionic gonadotropin (HCG), was
determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to be safe and effective. Id. at 1145.
The Commission found that respondent's failure to disclose that the weight reduction treatments
utilized injections of a drug lacking FDA approval for such uses rendered the advertisements
deceptive. The Commission therefore held that the ads violated § 5 of the FTC Act. Id.
27. See, e.g., American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 687 (3d Cir. 1982)
(Commission looks at entire advertisement in determining its capacity to deceive); Beneficial
Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976) (in finding deception, Commission will consider
advertisement's tendency to deceive), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977); United States Retail
Credit Ass'n, Inc. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 212, 221 (4th Cir. 1962) (test of deception is whether
advertisement has tendency or capacity to deceive); Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 604 (9th
Cir. 1957) (capacity to deceive is test for deception); but see Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC,
379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967) (test of deception is whether advertisement has likelihood or
capacity to deceive).
28. United States v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 1037 (D. Del. 1978). In this
case, the action was brought against Reader's Digest magazine for allegedly violating a consent
order in which it agreed to cease from using "simulated checks" in its sweepstakes promotions.
The "simulated.checks" were found to have a tendency or capacity to deceive the public into
believing that they were authentic, negotiable instruments.
Furthermore, the Commission may prohibit misleading conduct even if it is performed
unintentionally or in good faith. See Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 & n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (good faith will not immunize advertiser from responsibility for its misrepresenta-
tions); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 896 (9th Cir. 1960) (existence of good faith immaterial);
Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 181 (6th Cir.) (good faith of seller not a defense to a
§ 5 violation), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941); Travel King, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 715, 773 (1975)
(intent to deceive not an element of deception); cf. Litton Indus. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 364, 372
(9th Cir. 1982) (circumstances surrounding violation considered in entering remedial order);
Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 309 (7th Cir. 1979) (extent of advertiser's fault
has bearing on remedy).
29. A requirement of proof of actual injury might also be unduly burdensome and costly
to the Commission. For example, in United States v. Reader's Digest, 464 F. Supp. 1037 (D.
Del. 1978), the court noted that it was unlikely that the Commission would have undertaken
such a broad prohibition of the use of simulated checks in sweepstakes promotions if it had
to endure the burden of proving actual deception caused by the use of the checks. Id. at 1037,
1052. See American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 687 (3d Cir. 1982) (capacity to
deceive may be found without evidence of actual deception); Trans World Account, Inc. v.
FTC, 594 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1979) (proof of actual deception unnecessary if misrepresen-
tation tends to deceive); Resort Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir.)
(evidence of actual deception need not be shown in order to find deception), cert. denied sub.
noma. Mackenzie v. United States, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v.
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consumers. 0 To prevent deception, and to determine whether a particular
representation has a tendency or capacity to deceive, the Commission ex-
amines what the advertisement's effect would tend to be on the audience
targeted by the advertiser.
Both the Commission and the advertisers realize that certain groups of
consumers have peculiar vulnerabilities." For example, in ITT Continental
Baking Co. v. FTC,32 a baking company represented that its product,
"Wonder Bread," contained all of the essential nutrients necessary for the
FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944) (consumer testimony not required to find deception).
Furthermore, as a practical matter, injured consumers are unlikely to admit that they were
fooled by claims that advertisers say would deceive only ignorant and credulous people. See,
e.g., Geld v. FTC, 144 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1944) (Commission adequately supported finding
of deception with testimony of one witness who said that while she personally was not deceived
by respondent's claim that its hair coloring product was permanent, she believed that others
could be).
30. The FTC Act is not a penal or revenue raising measure; rather it is an attempt to
effectuate the consumer protection policies that underlie fair competition enforcement. United
States v. Saint Regis Paper Co., 355 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1966). In Saint Regis Paper, the
respondent violated a cease and desist order restraining it and 16 other competitors from
engaging in consort pricing of multiwall paper shipping sacks. Id. at 690. The court noted that
Congress relied on the flexibility of administrative process and the initiative of administrative
officials to promote the policies of fair competition. Id. at 693-94. See Regina Corp. v. FTC,
322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963) ("[tjhe purpose of the Federal Trade Commission Act is to
protect the public, not to punish a wrongdoer ... and it is in the public interest to stop any
deception at its incipiency"); accord Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 602 (9th Cir. 1957);
Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F. 744, 745 (2d Cir. 1922).
31. The Supreme Court, for example, has accepted a Commission finding that children are
peculiarly vulnerable to deceptive acts and practices. See FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Brother, Inc.,
291 U.S. 304, 313 (1933) (children are susceptible to deceptive advertising because of their
inability to protect themselves). The Commission also has noted the particular vulnerability of
children to deceptive advertising practices:
Thus, throughout the law in general and under Section 5 of the [Federal] Trade
Commission Act in particular, it has been recognized that minors constitute an
especially vulnerable and susceptible class requiring special protection from business
practices that would not be unlawful if they only involved adults. Accordingly, a
marketing practice, directed in a substantial part toward minors, that interferes
substantially and unjustifiably with their freedom of buying choice is an unfair or
deceptive act or practice even if it is not especially pernicious as to adults.
Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards
of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8358 (1964) (codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 408.1 to .4 (1985))
(statement of basis and purpose). See Avalon Indust., Inc., 83 F.T.C 1728, 1750 (1974) (higher
standard of care is required to protect children from deception); see also ITT Continental
Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865, 960-61 ("Wonder Bread" advertisements directed at parents and
children found deceptive), modified, 83 F.T.C. 1105 (1973), aff'd, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976);
Ideal Toy Co., 64 F.T.C. 297, 310 (1964) (children unable to recognize false representations
because of inexperience). See generally Notice of Proposed Trade Regulation Rulemaking and
Public Hearing on Children's Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967, 17,969 (1978) (statement of
issues presented by petitions for rulemaking); Pauker, Case for FTC Regulation of Television
Advertising Directed Toward Children, 46 BROOKLYN L. REv. 513, 513-46 (1980) (advocating
regulation of broadcast advertisements aimed at a juvenile market).
32. 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976).
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healthy growth and development of children." To ascertain the target con-
sumers' interpretation of this claim, the Commission surveyed the juvenile
market toward which the advertisement was directed.14 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Commission's finding
that the advertisements had a tendency to deceive children; the respondent
falsely implied that its product contained nutrients peculiarly essential for
normal growth and development."
A number of factors must be considered in determining whether an
advertisement has a tendency or capacity to deceive. These factors include
the advertising medium, the location and timing of the advertisement, and
the intended audience for the advertisement.16 For example, an advertisement
for sugar-coated cereal shown on Saturday morning television is likely to be
seen by young, unsophisticated consumers.37 On the other hand, an adver-
tisement for micro-computers placed in a business publication is more likely
to reach adult, intelligent consumers. Also, certain types of products are
typically marketed in a deceptive way.3" Consumers who read gossip maga-
zines in search of advertisements for mail-order weight reduction remedies
33. Id. at 210-12. The court found that respondent's advertisements impliedly represented
the following:
a) Wonder Bread is an outstanding source of nutrients, distinct from other
enriched breads.
b) Consuming . . . Wonder Bread . . . provides] a child . . . all the nutrients
essential to healthy growth and development.
c) Parents can rely on Wonder Bread to provide their children with all nutrients
that are essential to healthy growth and development.
d) The optimum contribution a parent can make to his child's nutrition is to
assure that the child consumes Wonder Bread regularly.
e) The protein supplied by . . . Wonder Bread is complete protein of high
nutritional quality necessary to assure maximum growth and development.
Id. at 212.
34. The Commission relied on the expert testimony of two psychiatrists and one pediatrician
regarding the likely effect that the representations would have on the targeted juvenile audiences.
Id. at 214. See also Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir.
1944) (findings of capacity to deceive based on surveys of women who were likely purchasers
of respondent's skin care product); see also Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952,
955 (2d Cir.) (finding capacity to deceive based on surveys of bald men to whom product was
marketed), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960).
35. 532 F.2d at 220.
36. See Horizon Corp., 97 F.T.C 464, 810 n.13 (1981) (considering potentially misleading
acts or practices "in light of the sophistication and understanding of the persons to whom they
were directed"); Raymond Lee Org., Inc., 92 F.T.C. 489, 628 (1978), aff'd, 679 F.2d 905 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
37. See cases cited supra note 31.
38. The Commission realizes that it would be impossible to hold an advertiser liable for
every possible interpretation of one of its ads. See Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963),
aff'd, 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964). In Kirchner, the Commission commented on its responsibility
to prevent the "gullible and tredulous" from being deceived:
True, as has been reiterated many times, the Commission's responsibility is to
prevent deception of the gullible and credulous, as well as the cautious and knowl-
edgeable . . . This principle loses its validity, however, if it is applied uncritically
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require more protection from deception than experienced plant managers
who read technical journals for advertised information on industrial equip-
ment.39
An advertisement's tendency to deceive is currently understood to mean
the advertisement's tendency to deceive an audience more gullible than the
reasonable consumer.40 In Aronberg v. FTC,41 the petitioner marketed a
drug called "Triple X Compound," which purportedly induced menstruation
in women.4 2 The court affirmed the Commission's finding of deception,
stating that the FTC Act protects the "ignorant, the unthinking and the
credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze but too often
or pushed to an absurd extreme. An advertiser cannot be charged with liability in
respect to every conceivable misconception, however outlandish, to which his rep-
resentations might be subject among the foolish or feeble-minded .... Perhaps a
few misguided souls believe, for example, that all "Danish pastry" is made in
Denmark .... A representation does not become "false and deceptive" merely
because it will be unreasonably misunderstood by an insignificant and unrepresen-
tative segment of the class of persons to whom the representation is addressed.
Id. at 1290. See also The Kroger Co., 98 F.T.C. 639, 728 (1981) (advertisers are not liable for
every possible interpretation of their advertisements), modified, 100 F.T.C. 573 (1982).
39. Porter v. Diersch, 605 F.2d 294, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1979).
40. Early in the Commission's history, the Supreme Court applied a "reasonable person
standard" to its review of Commission findings. See FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S.
67, 79 (1934). The Court noted that "the careless and unscrupulous must rise to the standards
of the scrupulous and diligent. The Commission was not organized to draw the standard down."
Id. The "reasonable person standard" was soon abandoned for a lower, more protective
standard. Even today, the Commission states its findings in terms of whether ordinary or
average consumers would be deceived by a claim. See, e.g., Stupell Originals, Inc., 67 F.T.C.
173, 186 (1965) (ordinary purchaser would not recognize defect in goggles); Warner-Lambert
Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1415 n.4 (1975) (evaluating effect of Listerine ad on average consumer),
aff'd as modified, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).
The Commission has not specified a minimum percentage of consumers who must be misled
for a claim to be labelled deceptive. One commentator noted: "Generally, twenty or twenty-
five percent may be considered a substantial number. A smaller percentage may be sufficient,
however, if physical injury or large monetary loss could result from consumers being misled."
Bailey & Pertschuk, supra note 3, at 890-91. See American Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C.
136, 393-94 (deception found where 22% of viewers concluded that seller's over-the-counter
drug relieved tension), aff'd as modified, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982); Bristol-Myers Co., 85
F.T.C. 688, 745 (1975) (deception found where 14 to 33% of consumers understood advertise-
ment to mean that "Dry Ban" deodorant "went on dry"); Benrus Watch Co., 64 F.T.C. 1018,
1045 (1964) (deception found where 14% of the watch buying public was mislead), aff'd, 352
F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1965).
41. 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942).
42. The following were typical advertisements for "Triple X Compound":
Don't be alarmed over delayed, overdue, unnaturally suppressed periods. A new
discovery-Triple-X Relief Compound is fastest acting, safest aid to married women.
Acts without discomfort or inconvenience even in obstinate cases.
Much of the constant charm and loveliness of womanhood depends upon a
regular occurrence of her periodic function. When a lapse of this vital function
occurs due to such causes as a cold, nervous strain, exposure or many other abnormal
reasons, her comfort is often disturbed by pain * * * her disposition is apt to turn
irritable. What is more, the happiness of those dear to her may be affected.
Id. at 166-67
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are governed by appearances and general impressions. "41 The United States
Supreme Court, in FTC v. Standard Education Society," also stated that
the FTC Act should be construed broadly to protect consumers from decep-
tive practices . 4  In that case, the respondents represented falsely that they
were giving away free volumes of encyclopedias as part of a broader pitch
to sell complete sets." The Court held that "there is no duty resting upon
a citizen to suspect the honesty of those with whom he transacts business.
Laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious. '47
Most courts have upheld Commission findings that an advertisement had
a capacity to deceive, even when the deception resulted from an absurd or
unforeseen interpretation. For example, in Gelb v. FTC,4 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals sustained the Commission's finding that an advertisement
that supposedly claimed that a hair coloring product was permanent had a
capacity to deceive.4 9 Yet, only one consumer testified that the representation
deceived her.5 0 Some courts, however, have required that an advertisement
have more than a marginal tendency to deceive consumers in order to affirm
a Commission action against an advertiser. In Kirchner v. FTC,5 a Ninth
43. Id. at 167. Petitioner's advertisements were found deceptive because they failed to
disclose that the use of "Triple X Compound" could produce severe gastro-intestinal disturb-
ances, as well as toxic and circulatory abnormalities, in women who used the drug. Id. at 169.
44. 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
45. Id. at 116-20.
46. Id. at 114-15. Respondents also used fictitious testimonials and falsely represented that
they were selecting certain "well connected representative people" in order to present them
with a free "artcraft deluxe edition" of the encyclopedia. Id. at 114.
47. Id. at 116. The Court also stated that "[tlhe best element of business has long since
decided that honesty should govern competitive enterprises, and that the role of caveat emptor
should not be relied upon to reward fraud and deception." Id. See Doherty, Clifford, Steers
& Schenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 926 (6th Cir. 1968) ("the Commission is bound to
protect the public in general, the unsuspecting as well as the skeptical") (citing Exposition
Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962)); Exposition
Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961) ("in evaluating the tendency of language
to deceive, the Commission should look not to the most sophisticated readers, but rather to
the least"), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962).
48. 144 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1944).
49. Id. at 582. In Gelb, a "Clairol" hair coloring product was advertised as permanent
although new hair grown after application of the preparation would not be col6red. In addition,
the company represented that its product "reconditioned the hair" and was "harmless or safe
for use." Id.
50. Id. at 582. The only consumer who testified about the potential deception of the hair
coloring advertisement stated that the advertisement failed to deceive her, although she under-
stood how someone else could be deceived. Id. Direct consumer testimony is not necessary to
support Commission findings. See, e.g., Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC,
392 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1968) (to establish capacity to deceive, Commission need not
produce witnesses to testify that they were deceived into believing that throat lozenges had
therapeutic effect); United States v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 1037, 1052-55
(D. Del. 1978) (magazine contest found to have the "capacity or tendency" to deceive without
actual proof of injury caused by simulated sweepstake checks).
51. 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964).
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Circuit case from 1964, a manufacturer falsely represented that its swimming-
aid device would enable a non-swimmer to swim.5 2 The Kirchner court stated
that an advertisement had no tendency to deceive, under the FTC Act, when
an insignificant number of consumers interpreted the advertisement unrea-
sonably.53 The Kirchner court left unanswered the questions of what makes
an interpretation unreasonable, and what number of consumers comprise an
insignificant number.5 4
Fourth, the Commission must determine that a representation is materially
deceptive." One example of what constitutes a material deception was dis-
cussed by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.56 In Colgate-
Palmolive, the respondent company claimed in a television advertisement
that its product, a shaving cream, could soften a piece of sandpaper for
shaving. 7 A Commission hearing examiner learned that the product could
soften sandpaper only after the paper had soaked in the cream for eighty
52. Id. at 752. A typical advertisement for respondent's swimming-aid device was as follows:
SWIM EZY
(Depiction of a young lady in a bathing suit)
INVISIBLE SWIM AID
NON-SWIMMERS SWIM INSTANTLY
Yes, now you too can swim like a fish the easy, safe way * * * new, unique 4-
oz. device, 1/25" thin, worn INVISIBLE under bathing suit or swim trunks, floats
you at ease, without effort * * * it makes anyone unsinkable. Poor swimmers look
like champions * * *money back guarantee * *
Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1283 (1963).
53. 337 F.2d at 752-53.
54. In American Home Prod. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982), the court of appeals
was unwilling to accept a Commission finding that claims for an over-the-counter pain reliever
had a capacity to deceive, when only 7% of targeted consumers were projected to be deceived.
Id. at 699. But see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1112 (1973) (capacity to deceive fopnd when 15% of consumers were misled).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1). Section 55(a)(1) states:
The term "false advertisement" means an advertisement, other than labeling, which
is misleading in a material respect; and in determining whether any advertisement
is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only
representations made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, sound, or
any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the advertisement fails to
reveal facts material in the light of such representations or material with respect to
consequences which may result from the use of the commodity to which the
advertisement relates under the conditions prescribed in said advertisement, or under
such conditions as are customary or usual.
Id. (emphasis added). Generally, an act or practice is deceptive only if it is misleading in a
material way. Materiality refers to the ability of an act or practice to influence a consumer's
decision to purchase a product or service. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 387
(1965); see also American Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C 136, 368 (1981) (misleading information
must materially affect a consumer's decision to purchase a product or service).
56. 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
57. Id. at 376-77. The case arose from an assertion by Colgate-Palmolive that its brand of
shaving cream could "out shave" all competitors. Id. at 376.
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minutes; 8 this fact was not disclosed in the commercial.5 9 In holding that
the commercial misrepresented a material fact, the Court accepted the Com-
mission's definition of a material fact as any representation that could be
an important inducement or motivation for the consumer to purchase that
product. 60 The Commission is not required to find an actual consumer injury
to conclude that a representation is materially deceptive. 6' Given the Supreme
Court's broad interpretation of what constitutes a material deception, courts
typically defer to Commission findings in that area.62
B. Commission Rulemaking Procedures
Under the FTC Act, the Commission has the authority to regulate deceptive
acts or practices in commerce. 63 Before 1962, the Commission administered
its deception policy solely through case-by-case adjudication.6 The Com-
mission issued complaints, *conducted hearings, made findings of facts, and
issued cease-and-desist orders. 6 While this approach is still in use today
58. Id. at 376. Colgate-Palmolive simulated the sandpaper shaving test using plexiglass
covered with sand because the TV camera could not detect the grainy nature of real sandpaper.
Id. at 377. The hearing examiner dismissed the complaint because he believed that neither the
misrepresentation concerning the actual soaking time, nor the identity of the shaved substance,
was a material misrepresentation that would mislead the public. Id.
59. Id. at 376.
60. Id. at 386-87. Product demonstrations or visual displays may deceive consumers because
they misrepresent the performance or capabilities of a product. Id. at 391-92. See, e.g., Standard
Oil Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978) (visual demonstration that product substan-
tially reduced automobile exhaust emissions was misleading); ITT Continental Baking Co. v.
FTC, 532 F.2d 207, 214-15 (2d Cir. 1976) (visual sequence showing child growing up in seconds
misrepresented "Wonder Bread" as an extraordinary growth food for children); Libbey-Owens-
Ford Glass Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 415, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1965) (television depiction of glass
window deceptive where purported photograph through glass was taken through an open
window).
61. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
62. ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207, 218 (2d Cir. 1976) (deferring
to Commission's finding that respondent's claims about nutritional value of its bread were
materially overstated and therefore misleading).
63. The FTC Act of 1914 stated: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby
declared unlawful." Ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)). Congress extended Commission jurisdiction to "deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce," which delegated to the Commission the responsibilty of regulating anti-consumer as
well as anti-competitive practices. The Wheeler-Lea Act of 1934, ch, 49, 52 Stat. 111. (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §45 (a)(1)).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (describing power of Commission to prohibit deceptive acts or practices
by adjudication).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). Section 45(b) states:
Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such person,
partnership or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition
or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce, and if it shall
appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to
the interest of the public, it shall issue and serve upon such person, partnership,
or corporation a complaint stating its charges in that respect and containing a notice
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against some deceptive acts, it proved to be costly and time-consuming as
the sole remedy for deception. 66 Moreover, the issuance of a cease-and-desist
order against one company had no direct influence on similar practices
throughout the industry.
In 1962, the Commission established a Rules Division to issue trade
regulation rules. 67 In the first trade regulation adopted by the Rules Divi-
sion-limitations on cigarette advertising 68-the Commission stated in its
basis and purpose69 that trade regulation rules should be adopted to prevent
deceptive practices throughout an entire industry. 70 Aside from its general
efficiency, rulemaking is fair to all companies in an industry because the
entire industry receives notice about what practices are considered to be
deceptive. 7'
The Commission's rulemaking practice was given statutory sanction in the
Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975
(FTCIA). 72 The FTCIA created statutory rulemaking authority for the Com-
mission in the field of consumer protection. The FTCIA also required the
of a hearing upon a day and at a place therein fixed at least thirty days after the
service of said complaint. The person, partnership, or corporation so complained
of shall have the right to appear at the place and time so fixed and show cause
why an order should not be entered by the Commission requiring such person,
partnership, or corporation to cease and desist from the violation of the law so
charged in said complaint ....
66. See H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7702, 7713-14. For a discussion of the criticisms of the adjudicative mode of
regulation, see Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 376-77 (1974).
67. E. KINTER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 64 (2d ed. 1978). At that
time § 6(g) of the FTC Act was the Commission's statutory authority for rulemaking. Section
6(g) states that the Commission shall have the power "to make rules and regulations for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act." 15 U.S.C. § 46(g).
68. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964) (codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 408.1-.4 (1985)).
69. Every trade regulation rule issued by the Commission must include a statement of basis
and purpose (SBP). 15 U.S.C. § 57a(d)(1). The SBP must include:
(A) a statement as to the prevalence of the acts or practices treated by the rule; (B)
a statement as to the manner and context in which such acts or practices are unfair
or deceptive; and (C) a statement as to the economic effect of the rule, taking into
account the effect on small business and consumers.
70. 9 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964) (codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 408.1-.4 (1985)).
71. Id. at 8366-68. See also Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Anaylsis, 51 CORNELL
L.Q. 678, 749-51 (1966).
72. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
For a discussion of the legislative history of the act prior to 1975, see Note, FTC Substantive
Rulemaking: An Evaluation of Past Practice and Proposed Legislation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV.
135, 139-40 (1973). Unless otherwise provided by Congress, federal administrative agencies are
governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982).
The APA requires that administrative rulemaking conform to one of two models: formal
or informal. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 556-57. Pursuant to formal rulemaking procedures, an agency
must conduct evidentiary hearings during which interested parties are entitled to cross-examine
witnesses. All hearings must be on the record and must use formal rulemaking procedures. In
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Commission to follow certain procedures in addition to those required for
informal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act.73
Under the "hybrid procedures ' 74 of the FTCIA, the Commission begins
the rulemaking process by publishing initial notice of the proposed rule."
The Commission then designates a presiding officer to set an agenda for the
rulemaking proceedings. 76 After final notice of the proposed rule is published
in the Federal Register,7 the presiding officer conducts oral hearings, which
include the opportunity for interested parties to cross-examine witnesses
addition, a statement of basis and purpose must accompany every published rule. See supra
note 69. Informal rulemaking requires that an agency publish notice in the Federal Register,
solicit comments from interested parties, and publish a final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
73. Rulemaking procedures that combine special agency requirements with APA requirements
are termed "hybrid." 5 U.S.C. § 553.
74. Hybrid rulemaking procedures have been enacted for other agencies. See Williams,
"Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Anal-
ysis, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 401, 425-36 (1975); Kestenbaum, Rulemaking Beyond APA: Criteria
for Trial-Type Procedures and the FTC Improvement Act, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 679, 686
(1976).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (1982) states:
(b) Procedures applicable
(I) When prescribing a rule under subsection (a)(l)(B) of this section, the Com-
mission shall proceed in accordance with section 553 of Title 5, [5 U.S.C. § 553]
(without regard to any reference in such section to sections 556 and 557 of such
title [5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 5571), and shall also (A) publish a notice of proposed
rulemaking stating with particularity the text of the rule, including any alternatives,
which the Commission proposes to promulgate, and the reason for the proposed
rule; (B) allow interested persons to submit written data, views, and arguments,
and make all such submissions publicly available; (C) provide an opportunity for
an informal hearing in accordance with subsection (c) of this section; and (D)
promulgate, if appropriate, a final rule based on the matter in the rulemaking
record (as defined in subsection (e)(1)(B) of this section), together with a statement
of basis and purpose.
(2)(A) Prior to the publication of any notice of proposed rulemaking pursuant
to paragraph (I)(A), the Commission shall publish an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register. Such advance notice shall-
(i) contain a brief description of the area of inquiry under consideration, the
objectives which the Commission seeks to achieve, and possible regulatory alter-
natives under consideration by the Commission; and
(ii) invite the response of interested parties with respect to such proposed rule-
making, including any suggestions or alternative methods for achieving such objec-
tives.
(B) The Commission shall submit such advance notice of proposed rulemaking
to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and to
the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. The
Commission may use such additional mechanisms as the Commission considers
useful to obtain suggestions regarding the content of the area of inquiry before the
publication of a general notice of proposed rulemaking under paragraph (1)(A).
(C) The Committee shall, 30 days before the publication of a notice of proposed
rulemaking pursuant to paragraph (1)(A), submit such notice to the Commission
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and to the Committee on
Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
76. 16 C.F.R. § 1.ll(a)(4) (1985).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (1982).
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about the proposed rule."' Following the hearings, Commission staff members
place recommendations in the rulemaking record,79 and the presiding officer
makes a recommendation about the proposed rule0 based upon the findings
and conclusions on the record." All recommendations are made public and
interested parties have an opportunity to comment on them for the record.12
Finally, the entire rulemaking record is submitted to the Commission for its
judgment. If the Commission promulgates a final rule, it is published in the
Federal Register, accompanied by a statement of basis and purpose. 3
II. THE COMMISSION'S 1983 DECEPTION ENFORCEMENT POLICY
On October 14, 1983, the Commission adopted its Policy for enforcement
of the FTC Act injunction against deceptive acts or practices.8 4 Three Com-
78. 16 C.F.R. § 1.12(d) (1985). Cross-examination can be limited by the presiding officer
to issues of material fact, and the presiding officer can limit the number of cross-examinations.
15 U.S.C. § 57a(c).
79. 16 C.F.R. § 1.13(0 (1985).
80. Id.
81. Id. § 1.13(g).
82. Id. § 1.13(h).
83. See supra note 69. The rule becomes effective on the fourth day after publication. 16
C.F.R. § 1.14(c) (1982).
The Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980 (FTCIA), Pub. L. No. 96-252,
94 Stat. 393 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) amended the rulemaking procedures
in several ways. It added a legislative veto section. Id. § 57a-1. This section is now probably
unconstitutional. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The FTCIA orders the Commission to
publish a regulatory analysis of proposed rules, which states the objectives sought to be achieved
under the rule. Id. § 57b-3(b). Also, the FTCIA calls for broader judicial review of Commission
decisions; the statute gives the courts of appeals authority to reverse decisions that are not
based on substantial evidence, id. § 57a(e)(3)(A), or that were procedurally defective in some
material way, id. § 57a(e)(3)(B)(i)-(ii).
84. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,071-79.
In 1982, Chairman Miller lobbied Congress to include in § 5 of the FTC Act a statutory
definition of deception. Miller offered the definition to "reduce the uncertainty that attends
the present broad discretion in the Commission's statute." Federal Trade Comm'n Reauthori-
zation, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1982) (Statement of Chairman
Miller) [hereinafter cited as 1982 House Hearings]. The proposed statutory definition stated
that the Commission would find deception if "an act or practice would deceive a reasonable
person to their [sic] detriment or a statement that the perpetrator knew or should have known
was misleading." Id. After hearing testimony from the Commissioners, the subcommittee failed
to pass this proposed definition. Three Commissioners believed a legislative definition was
unnecessary. See id. at 45 (Clanton, Comm'r); id. at 51 (Bailey, Comm'r); id. at 76 (Pertschuk,
Comm'r). Commissioner Douglas, however, was in favor of a statutory definition of deception.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) (written statement of Douglas, Comm'r).
In 1983, Chairman Miller again attempted to have Congress define deception. Federal Trade
Comm 'n Reauthorization-1983, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation,
and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1983)
(statement of Chairman Miller). This new proposal would have defined "[deception (as] a
material misrepresentation that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably in the circum-
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missioners voted in favor of the Policy, and two voted against."5 The Policy
was adopted by the Commissioners without public hearings. Nevertheless,
the new Policy portended major changes in the enforcement of its deception
policy.
Chairman Miller expressed the majority view in a letter to the Chairman
of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Representative John
Dingell.8 6 The Policy states that deception will be found where "[t]here is a
representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer
acting reasonably in the circumstances to the consumer's detriment."", This
Policy contains what Chairman Miller characterizes as a clear and under-
standable standard of deception as derived from prior case law.88 The purpose
of this purported restatement was to provide guidance and certainty to
businesses and consumers.8 9
Commissioners Pertschuk and Bailey wrote strong dissents in opposition
to the Policy.9 The dissenters doubted the accuracy of Chairman Miller's
restatement of the definition of deception. Although the purported restate-
ment is semantically similar to the prior case law definition, 9 the dissenters
argued that the Policy is actually a substantial departure from well-established
precedent on deception.92 The dissenters argued that the Policy improperly
combines apparently correct legal principles with Chairman Miller's personal
views on the law of deception.93 The dissenters concluded that the true
purpose of the Policy is to narrow the Commission's policing power over
stances to their detriment or that the misrepresentor knew or should have known would be
misleading." Id. at 6. Chairman Miller referred to this proposal as "the same definition I
recommended last year." Id. The proposal emphasized that "there should be evidence that
consumers are indeed injured" before a practice is alleged to be deceptive. Id. at 16; see also
id. at 84 (statement of Douglas, Comm'r) (FTC Act should require Commission "to find
economic injury to consumers before proceeding"). The proposal also repeated Chairman
Miller's request for a "reasonable consumer" standard of deception. Id. at 16.
85. The majority comprised Chairman Miller. Commissioner Douglas, and outgoing Com-
missioner Clanton. Strong dissents were filed by Commissioners Bailey and.Pertschuk. Policy,
supra note 3, at 56,071-79 (Bailey and Pertschuk, Comm'rs, dissenting).
86. Policy, supra note 3.
87. Id. at 56,072.
88. Id. at 56,071.
89. Id. at 56,085-86 (Douglas, Comm'r, concurring).
90. Id. at 56,079-84 (Pertschuk and Bailey, Comm'rs, dissenting).
91. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1919) (test of deception
is whether an act or practice has the "tendency or capacity" to mislead a substantial number
of consumers in a material way). See Bailey & Pertschuk, supra note 3, at 850.
92. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,079-80 (Bailey, Comm'r, dissenting). Commissioner Pertschuk
speculated: "There is, of course, more than a little inconsistency in failing to persuade Congress
that the law of deception should be changed, then concluding that the law was already the way
the Chairman wanted it to be." Id. at 56,083 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, dissenting). Generally,
Commissioner Pertschuk stated that the Policy is "internally inconsistent, confusing, and slip-
shod in use of legal precedent." Id.
93. Id. at 56,084.
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deceptive advertising practices and thereby diminish consumer protection
against unethical and fraudulent advertising practices.94
Chairman Miller's Policy adopts a formal, three-point definition of de-
ception. A deceptive claim must be likely to deceive consumers, must deceive
reasonably prudent consumers, and must be a material misrepresentation of
fact. Notwithstanding the dissenters's belief that the Policy is unsupported
by case law, 9' each separate element is substantiated by some precedent. Yet,
the majority's interpretation of the cases is strained, and the effect of the
Policy is to inhibit government intervention into the marketplace.
9 6
A. The "Likely to Deceive" Standard and
Additional Evidentiary Burdens
The Policy states that in any deception case the Commission must find
"a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the con-
sumer." 97 The Policy's requirement that an advertisement be "likely to
deceive" consumers is a blatant departure from the previously established
"tendency or capacity to deceive" standard. 9 Remarkably, Chairman Miller
cites the single case of Beneficial Corp. v. FTC99 in support of the "likely
to mislead" standard. In Beneficial Corp., a finance company advertised a
consumer loan as "an instant tax refund."' ' ° The Commission determined
that the quoted representation had the tendency to lead consumers to believe
falsely that the availability of the loan was based on income tax refund
entitlement, rather than on traditional credit worthiness.10' The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the Commission's decision.
Chairman Miller's interpretation of the Beneficial Corp. case, as applying
a "likely to deceive" standard, is of doubtful validity. First, the opinion
contains numerous references to the obligation of the Commission to find
a mere tendency to deceive in a representation, rather than an actual decep-
tion. 0 2 Chairman Miller, in his Policy statement, overlooked these references
and relied upon a single sentence in the opinion that used the phrase
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Policy, supra note 3, at 56,082-84 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, dissenting).
97. Id. at 56,071. The Policy states that the first relevant inquiry is whether the consumer
is "likely" to be deceived, rather than whether actual deception occurs. Id. at 56,072-73.
Chairman Miller relied on Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976) ("the
likelihood or propensity of deception is the criterion by which advertising is measured"), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977), for the proposition that representations need only be likely, rather
than certain, to deceive consumers.
98. See supra notes 27-54 and accompanying text.
99. 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
100. Id. at 614.
101. Id. at 617.
102. Id. at 617-18. That the Commission is obligated to find a mere tendency to deceive,
rather than actual deception, is referred to three times on page 617 of the opinion, and once
on page 618.
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"likelihood or propensity" to deceive, rather than "tendency or capacity to
deceive."'' 3 If the opinion is read as a whole, in light of the court's numerous
references to the word "tendency," it is apparent that the court used the
phrase "likelihood or propensity" in one instance simply to provide stylistic
variety in the opinion, rather than to suggest a substantive change in the
law of deception. 14
Second, the court in Beneficial Corp. emphasized that a showing of actual
deception was not required to prove a deception claim.' 0 The court appar-
ently never intended for the term "likelihood or propensity" to mean
anything different than "tendency or capacity."" 6 On the contrary, all of
the cases cited in support of the "likelihood or propensity" language actually
applied a "tendency or capacity" standard.'01 For this reason, the court's
single use of the phrase "likelihood or propensity" should not be read as a
substantive change in the deception standard.
The controversy over the majority's switch from a "tendency" to a
"likelihood" of deception standard centers on the question of whether the
Commission intended to create a higher standard of proof for deception.
The word "likely" denotes an "imminent" event, while the word "tendency"
suggests a mere "inclination."' 0° Although the Policy does not explicitly call
for a high probability of deception, Chairman Miller has twice requested
Congress to produce a statutory definition of deception that incorporates a
high probability standard.1°9 Presumably, Chairman Miller's substitution of
the word "tendency" with the word "likely" is a deliberate attempt to raise
the standard of probability of deception.
A higher standard for deception may also be inferred from the Policy's
occasional reference to a supposed prima facie requirement of extrinsic
evidence of deception." 0 Chairman Miller asserts that extrinsic evidence may
103. Id. at 617.
104. See Bailey & Pertschuk, supra note 3, at 856 n.41.
105. 542 F.2d at 617.
106. See Bailey & Pertschuk, supra note 3, at 856 n.41.
107. The four cases on which the Beneficial court relied did not apply a single, "likely to
deceive" standard. See Resort Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir.)
(Commission "has the expertise to determine whether advertisements have the capacity to
deceive or mislead the public"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); Montgomery Ward & Co.
v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967) ("the likelihood of deception or the capacity to
deceive is the criterion by which the advertising is judged"); Bankers Sec. Corp. v. FTC, 297
F.2d 403, 404-05 (3d Cir. 1961) (court applied neither "likelihood" nor "tendency or capacity"
standard in affirming Commission's finding of deception); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 897 (9th
Cir. 1960) (Commission's use of the "tendency or capacity to deceive" standard was not
challenged by court upon review).
108. WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 666 (1977).
109. See supra note 92.
110. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,073. Chairman Miller stated that when the Commission
considers the meaning of implied representations, in some situations "the Commission will
require extrinsic evidence that reasonable consumers reach the implied claims .... [Tlhe
Commission will carefully consider any extrinsic evidence that is introduced." Id. at 56,072-73
(emphasis added).
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be required to determine consumer perception from misrepresentations or
omissions."' In support of this assertion, Chairman Miller cited"2 a footnote
found in Leonard F. Porter, Inc.," ' a Commission adjudication from 1976.
In Porter, the respondent was ordered to cease distribution of its products,
which, by virtue of their appearance and design, appeared to be handcrafted
by native Alaskan Indians. The products were actually manufactured by
non-native, non-Alaskan Indians in the state of Washington." 14 Because there
was no evidence that consumers would assume that the products were made
by native Americans," 5 the Porter Commission found no deception in the
merchant's failure to disclose the true origin of the products.",
To support his proposition that extrinsic evidence is required in some
instances to determine consumer expectations, Miller cited" '6 the following
footnote from the Porter decision:
By requiring such evidence, we do not imply that elaborate proof of
consumer beliefs or behavior is necessary, even in a case such as this, to
establish the requisite capacity to deceive. However, where visual inspection
is inadequate, some extrinsic testimonial evidence must be added.",
Chairman Miller's reliance on this single footnote in Porter misconstrued
the legal precedent. Chairman Miller failed to include, along with the foot-
note, the language from the opinion to which the footnote was appended:
While it is certainly within the authority and expertise of the Commission
to make such a determination [of deception], the judgment involved is
one which cannot with prudence be made without some resort to record
evidence respecting the assumptions, attitudes, and behavior of consumers
in Alaskan gift shops.''
At first glance, the text and footnote appear inconsistent. However, if the
text and footnote are read in the context of the whole opinion, it is apparent
that the Porter Commission intended to say that findings supported by
extrinsic evidence were helpful but not essential. The Porter Commission
also believed that, even without extrinsic evidence, it had the authority and
expertise to decide whether an advertisement had a tendency to deceive."19
In unusual cases such as Porter, therefore, proper judicial prudence calls for
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing Leonard F. Porter, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 546, 626 n.5 (1976)).
113. 88 F.T.C. 546, 626-27 (1976).
114. Id.
115. See also Elliot Knitwear, Inc. v. FTC, 266 F.2d 787, 789 (2d Cir. 1959) (term "Cash-
mora" on sweater labels not "deceptive per se" when labels also disclosed sweater content);
The Kroger Co., 98 F.T.C. 639, 728-30 (1981) (summary judgment improper where factual
issue remains concerning message of advertisement), modified, 100 F.T.C. 573 (1982).
116. See supra note 112.
117. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,073 n.13 (quoting Leonard F. Porter, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 546,
626 n.5 (1976)).
118. Leonard F. Porter, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 546, 626 (1976).
119. See supra text accompanying note 118. See also supra notes 19-21 (Commission may
base finding of deception solely on own authority).
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a showing of extrinsic evidence; in no event, however, is such a showing of
extrinsic evidence required by the FTC Act. Referring to the Porter footnote
without citing the text, 20 as Chairman Miller did in the majority statement, 2'
misrepresents the opinion. 22
In sum, the Commission's requirement that an advertisement be likely to
deceive makes the Policy ambiguous.' 23 If Chairman Miller intended for the
word "likelihood" to have any meaning different from the traditional lan-
guage of "tendency or capacity" to deceive, then the Policy is supported
only by the most circuitous reading of prior case law. If Chairman Miller
intended "tendency" and "likelihood" to have the same meaning, on the
other hand, then there was no need to deviate from the established lan-
guage. 24 Such ambiguity in the first element of the reformulated definition
of deception does not comport with the professed purpose of the Policy-
to provide certainty and guidance to businesses and consumers. 25
120. See supra text accompanying note 117.
121. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,072-73.
122. Even taken in the most innocent light, the majority's reliance upon a single footnote
to support its broad proposition that extrinsic evidence is required to prove deception is, at
best, tenuous. On the other hand, Commissioner Pertschuk's assertion that the Commission
now requires extrinsic evidence in all cases, Policy, supra note 3, at 56,084 (Pertschuk, Comm'r,
dissenting), is also unsupported by the Porter opinion. The Porter Commission stated that the
need for extrinsic evidence varies from case to case:
An advertisement for shaving cream is likely to convey fairly much the same meaning
to the Commission viewing it in chambers as it is to consumers seeing it in their
living rooms. Similarly, the deceptive potential of a box filled half with toys and
half with air is no less apparent when perched on our meeting table than when
nestled on the retailer's shelf. The evidence in this case is somewhat different. We
have looked at the seals, walruses, Eskimos, story bracelets, totem poles, creches,
mukluks, billikens and other artifacts placed in the record by complaint counsel.
Simply from viewing these items, without further information, we would not
conclude that they possess the capacity to deceive as to their origin and method of
manufacture. We are asked to determine, however, whether they would have such
capacity when viewed by consumers in Alaska. While it is certainly within the
authority and expertise of the Commission to make such a determination, the
judgment involved is one which cannot with prudence be made without some resort
to record evidence respecting the assumptions, attitudes, and behavior of consumers
in Alaskan gift shops.
Leonard F. Porter Inc., 88 F.T.C. 546, 625-26 (1976) (footnote omitted).
In a footnote to its opinion, the Porter Commission stated that " [b]y requiring such evidence,
we do not imply that elaborate proof of consumer beliefs or behavior is necessary, even in a
case such as this, to establish the requisite capacity to deceive. However, where visual inspection
is inadequate, some extrinsic testimonial evidence must be added." Id. at 626 n.5.
123. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,080-81 (Bailey, Comm'r, dissenting).
124. Commissioner Bailey commented that:
[lne is left to wonder whether these two perhaps similar ideas are indeed the same,
and if so why the traditional "tendency or capacity" phrasing was not used. On
the other hand if the "likelihood" standard is intended to describe a different
standard, is it a higher or a lower standard?
Id. at 56,080.
125. Id. at 56,071, 56,079.
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B. "Reasonable Person" Standard
The Policy states "that to be deceptive the representation, omission or
practice must be likely to mislead reasonable consumers under the circum-
stances" of the representation. 26 In a footnote to this statement, the majority
of the Commission supposedly elaborated on its standard of a reasonable
consumer: "An interpretation may be reasonable even though it is not shared
by a majority of consumers in the relevant class, or by particularly sophis-
ticated consumers. A material practice that misleads a significant minority
of reasonable consumers is deceptive.""'2 Surprisingly, the standards of
reasonableness suggested respectively by the text and the footnote do not
correspond. The text of the Policy implies that a consumer's interpretation
of a representation must be objectively reasonable in order for the represen-
tation to be colorably deceptive. 2 The footnote, in contrast, suggests that
an interpretation of an advertised claim may be reasonable even if the
interpretation is shared by only an ignorant and credulous few. Again, the
distinctions are subtle, but one would expect the majority to state a new
"reasonable person" standard unambiguously, in order to further the Pol-
icy's purpose of guidance and certainty.
The Policy also ambiguously refers to the Kirchner129 case in support of
its discussion of the "reasonable consumer" standard. 30 The majority cited
Kirchner to justify the use of the word "reasonable" to qualify the type of
consumer that deserves protection.' 3 ' Again, Chairman Miller's use of the
case law is strained. The majority asserted that "to be considered reasonable,
the [consumer's] interpretation or reaction does not have to be the only
one."'3 2 The footnote that supports this statement'" implies that a claim
may be found to be deceptive if it has more than one meaning, even if one
126. Id. at 56,074.
127. Id. at 56,074 n.20 (citing Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d
751 (9th Cir. 1964)).
128. Id. at 56,074.
129. 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964). For a discussion of the
Kirchner decision, see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
130. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,074 & n.20.
131. According to the dissenters from the Policy, there is no authority for the majority's
assertion that an act or practice must be considered from the perspective of a "reasonable
consumer":
There is no authority for the new standard's proposition that the Commission may
not find a violation of section 5 unless consumers were acting reasonably. Existing
case law almost universally focuses on the reasonableness of the Commission's
interpretation of an act or practice. Although some cases have described how
consumers could reasonably have interpreted an advertisement as making a mis-
leading claim, these cases have done so only to illustrate the deceptive nature of
the claim and not to suggest that such a showing is necessary to a finding of
deception.
Bailey & Pertschuk, supra note 3, at 857 (emphasis in original).
132. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,074.
133. Id. at 56,074 n.21.
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of the interpretations is truthful.13 4 Nevertheless, the majority relied on this
language to support the proposition that consumers must be "reasonable"
in their interpretations of advertised claims. Presumably, the Kirchner court
intended to say that all alternative interpretations of ambiguous represen-
tation must be reasonable. The Commission majority used ambiguous lan-
guage from Kirchner to create a higher standard of proof for deception. 3,
To further buttress the "reasonable consumer" standard, the majority
proposed that companies charged with deception need not be liable for every
possible interpretation of claims by consumers. 3 6 To support this argument,
the majority quoted a statement of law from the Kirchner a7 decision:
An advertiser cannot be charged with liability with respect to every con-
ceivable misconception, however outlandish, to which his representations
might be subject among the foolish or feeble-minded. Some people, because
of ignorance or incomprehension, may be misled by even a scrupulously
honest claim. Perhaps a few misguided souls believe, for example, that all
"Danish pastry" is made in Denmark. Is it therefore an actionable decep-
tion to advertise "Danish pastry" when it is made in this country? Of
course not. A representation does not become "false and deceptive" merely
because it will be unreasonably misunderstood by an insignificant and
unrepresentative segment of the class of persons to whom the representation
is addressed.''
If the majority quoted this language to support the proposition that a
company will not be liable for every unreasonable interpretation by advertised
claims, then the Policy restates the obvious.3 9 It is more probable that the
134. The supporting footnote to this textual proposition stated that "[a] secondary message
understood by consumers is actionable if deceptive even though the primary message is accu-
rate." Id. (citing Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 348
U.S. 940 (1955); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 511 (1980), aff'd, 676 F.2d 385 (9th
Cir. 1982); Chrysler Corp., 87 F.T.C. 749, aff'd, 561 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1976), reissued, 90
F.T.C. 606 (1977)).
135. Commissioner Bailey commented on the "reasonableness" requirement that under the
new standard the Commission would be able to find deception only in cases in which consumers
have acted reasonably:
I have asked before and must ask again: is it "reasonable" to buy undeveloped
land sight unseen? Is it "reasonable" for a consumer to permit him or herself to
be baited and switched to a more expensive product than he or she went into a
store to buy? Is it "reasonable" to rely on oral representations in transactions
involving large sums of money when written contracts deny or disclaim any oral
misrepresentations? Different minds might reach different answers to these ques-
tions. Yet the Commission has traditionally chosen to protect consumers in these
circumstances .... I foresee a great harm to the public interest if this standard
prevents the Commission from continuing important work that has in the past
resulted in numerous lawsuits on behalf of literally thousands of injured consumers
and substantial monetary redress.
Policy, supra note 3, at 56,081.
136. Id. at 56,074.
137. Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964).
138. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,074 (quoting Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. at 1290). For a discussion
of the Kirchner decision, see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
139. Commissioner Pertschuk conceded in his dissent that the Commission should not take
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majority used this language to lay a foundation for further contractions of
the Commission's enforcement role; the Policy moves the Commission's
deception policy closer to a "reasonable consumer" standard. Since the
Policy implies that some interpretations are not actionable, the Commission
is set to impose a requirement that only the "reasonable consumer's"
interpretation of a claim may be considered in deception cases. Under such
a standard, consumers would be unprotected by the Commission if they were
injured as a result of their less than reasonable reliance upon misrepresen-
tations."4
A more correct interpretation of Kirchner can be drawn directly from the
opinion's language: "[A]s has been reiterated many times, the Commission's
responsibility is to prevent deception of the gullible and credulous, as well
as the cautious and knowledgeable.' 4 ' This statement is in contrast to
Chairman Miller's interpretation of Kirchner. Apparently, the Kirchner Com-
mission recognized the traditional principle that the Commission should
protect credulous consumers as well as reasonable ones. When the Kirchner
Commission spoke of the need to protect the "gullible and credulous," it
doubtlessly referred to the Commission's duty to protect a vulnerable segment
of the consuming public.
42
The Policy's "reasonable consumer" standard has some apparent support
in the case law. A substantial number of recent cases appear to use a
"reasonable consumer" standard. 43 The standard reflected in these recent
cases may reflect the Commission's belief that its resources are too limited
to expend on marginal deception cases. None of the cases, however, expressly
action against every possible misinterpretation. Commissioner Pertschuk stated that there "must
be a limit on our ability to guard against every possible wrong interpretation or an advertising
claim, and the Commission has recognized this." Policy, supra note 3, at 56,083 (Pertschuk,
Comm'r, dissenting) (citing Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. at 1290).
140. Commissioner Pertschuk criticized the majority's new "reasonable consumer" require-
ment:
The legitimate concern of advertisers, that the Commission will insist on interpre-
tations of claims that are unrealistic, is addressed by our willingness to consider
extrinsic evidence of consumers' understanding when there is a genuine factual
dispute. But there is a marginal segment of American commerical life-promoters
of instant weight loss, bust creams, and baldness remedies; purveyors of quick
fortunes in land speculation and pyramid schemes; seller of miracle cancer cures-
which exist only because there are unsophisticated consumers. To introduce into
the law the idea that the trusting don't deserve protection is "deregulation" in its
most reckless and pointless form.
Policy, supra note 3, at 56,083-84 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, dissenting).
141. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. at 1290.
142. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,075.
143. For example, the Policy cites the following cases' in support of its "reasonableness"
standard: Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 320 (1983) ("ads must be judged by the impression
they make on reasonable members of the public"), aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984); Sterlifig
Drug, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP.- (CCH) 22,124, at 22,910, 22914 (FTC July 5, 1983) ("consumers
could reasonably interpret the ads"); American Home Prod., 98 F.T.C. 136, 372 (1981) ("record
shows that consumers could reasonably have understood this language"), modified, 695 F.2d
681 (3d Cir. 1982).
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overturned the prior case law,'" which extended Commission protection to
less than reasonable consumers. Chairman Miller's reliance on these cases
would be more persuasive if the courts had actually invoked a "reasonable
consumer" standard in place of the earlier, lower standard. Yet, none of
the recent cases actually urge this policy. Therefore, the Commission's
reliance on these cases 4 s signals the majority's intent to use ambiguous
language to limit their authority to regulate deception.'4
C. Materiality/Injury Requirement
The third step in the Policy's deception analysis is the determination of
whether the deceptive representation is material in fact.4 7 A representation,
to be deceptive, must be of a sort that would influence a consumer's decision
to purchase a product.4 8 Standing alone, this third element is not a departure
from established case law. 49 Chairman Miller's Policy, however, goes further
and equates materiality with actual injury."10 The Policy states that when
consumers make purchases that are based on deceptive representations, they
detrimentally rely on those claims."' The term "detriment," as construed
by the Commission majority, presumes that a consumer has been injured by
the deception.5 2 The Policy states that "a finding of materiality is also a
finding that injury is likely to exist .... Injury exists if the consumer would
have chosen differently but for the deception.""'
144. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc., 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937) ("no duty resting
upon a citizen to suspect the honesty of those with whom he transacts business. Laws are made
to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious."); Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th
Cir. 1942) ("law is not made for experts but to protect the public-that vast multitude which
includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not
stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and general impressions"); Kirchner,
63 F.T.C. at 1290 ("Commission's responsibility is to prevent deception of the gullible and
credulous, as well as the cautious and knowledgeable"). See also Bailey & Pertschuk, supra
note 3, at 857 & n.45 (citing cases in which § 5 violations were found against advertisements
that deceived reasonable consumers); supra note 40 (Commission's rejection of reasonable
person standard).
145. See cases cited supra note 144.
146. See supra note 140. An alternative justification for the increased use of the "reasonable
consumer" standard in these decisions is the possible innocuous use of "reasonable" as a
modifier. It is doubtful that the proported "reasonableness" standard had any effect on the
outcome of these cases, since none of them addressed whether alternative interpretations must
be "reasonable" to be actionable.
147. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,077-78. A claim is "material" if it affects a consumer's
decision in determining whether to purchase a product. Cigarette Advertising and Labeling
Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8386-87 (1964) (codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 408.1-.4 (1985)) (statement
of basis and purpose) ("Is [the representation) likely to affect the average consumer in deciding
whether to purchase the advertised product-is there a material deception, in other words?").
148. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,077-78.
149. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
150. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,078-79.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 56,079.
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The Commission's dissenters 1 4 examined the majority's language on this
point and argued that the Policy imposed an "actual injury" requirement
on deception claims. 15 In the Policy statement, Chairman Miller also briefly
addressed the issue of an actual injury requirement:
A finding [of] materiality is also a finding that injury is likely to exist
because of the representation, omission, sales practice or marketing tech-
nique .... Injury exists if consumers would have chosen differently but
for the [d]eception. If different choices are likely, the claim is material,
and injury is likely as well. Thus, injury and materiality are different
names for the same concept. '-w
This statement treats an "injury" as one factor in a finding of materiality,
rather than as a separate element of deception that requires an independent
finding of actual injury. Nevertheless, this passage is susceptible to the
dissenters's construction that a showing of some actual injury is required,
especially in view of Chairman Miller's past lobbying efforts before Congress
for an actual injury requirement." 7
Chairman Miller's position on the actual injury requirement is vague at
best. 1 8 The language of the Policy on this issue might have been intended
to clarify the materiality requirement. Yet, the language might also have
been a ruse, as the dissenters claim, to make deception claims more difficult
to prove. 5 9 It is possible that, as a Reagan appointee, 160 Chairman Miller's
views on the Commission's role in deception cases merely reflect the Presi-
dent's general philosophy on the limited role of government in regulating
commerce. 161
The Commission majority asserted that, "where the Commission cannot
find materiality . . . the Commission may require evidence that the claim or
154. Commissioners Bailey and Pertschuk dissented from the Policy. Id. at 56,079-84 (Bailey
and Pertschuk, Comm'rs, dissenting).
155. Commissioner Pertschuk asserted that the majority required a "substantial" showing
of injury, id. at 56,084 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, dissenting), but neither the word "substantial"
nor synonyms appear in the majority's text. Pertschuk instead appears to have been criticizing
Miller's proposed statutory definition of deception and its accompanying testimony rather than
the Policy as stated. Commissioner Pertschuk asserted that the statutory proposal will: "l)
make legal limited injury, 2) hamstring the Commission in preventing injury that had not yet
occurred, and 3) introduce complex evidentiary problems in stopping even clearly misleading
advertisements." Id. at 56,084 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 56,081-82 (Commissioner
Bailey, dissenting) ("the statement equates materiality and injury, suggesting that actual injury
must be shown before a finding of materiality is made").
156. Id. at 56,079.
157. See supra note 84.
158. See supra note 147.
159. Commissioner Pertschuk stated that "[t]he overriding problem, however, is that the
drafters [of the majority statement] wanted to push the law in a new direction, one that would
make it harder for the commission to act and loosen the reins on dishonesty and unscrupulous
behavior." Policy, supra note 3, at 56,084 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, dissenting).
160. See supra note 2.
161. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,084 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, dissenting) ("To introduce into
the law the idea that the trusting don't deserve protection is 'degregulation' in its most reckless
form").
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omission is likely to be considered important by consumers. 1' 62 This state-
ment places a novel and burdensome requirement upon the Commission. In
cases where the deception is not patent, the Commission may have to gather
testimony from people who assert that they were deceived by claims that
were likely to influence only ignorant or credulous consumers. The majority,
however, did not cite any authority for this requirement.' 63 The majority
also stated that a deception is material if consumers would have chosen
differently "but for" the misleading act or practice.1M This proposition is
contrary to the established rule that any representation or omission that
affects a consumer's purchase decision is material.' 65 The new rule suggests
that actual reliance and causation are elements of materiality.'6
Commissioner Pertschuk, writing in dissent, perceived three likely conse-
quences of themajority's Policy.' 67 First, the Policy will change the law of
deception by creating a "legal limited injury" requirement.' 68 Determining
what Commissioner Pertschuk meant by "legal limited injury" is proble-
matic. It is possible that such a requirement calls for a fictional finding of
injury in each case of deception. Moreover, enforcement of the requirement
could degenerate into a battle among the Commissioners to loosen or tighten
the evidentiary standard for determining injury. '69 Second, Commissioner
Pertschuk argued that an actual injury requirement would cause the Com-
mission to turn away from the long-standing policy of preventing deception
by taking precautionary action against advertisers. 70 Finally, Commissioner
Pertschuk believes that the Policy will unduly hinder the Commission's
enforcement efforts against deception.' As a practical matter, it would be
difficult to get consumers to testify that they were duped and injured by
representations that the respondent claims could be misinterpreted only by
the ignorant and credulous."
III. IMPACT OF THE NEW DECEPTION ENFORCEMENT POLICY
The Policy has driven the Commission's membership in two directions.
First, for the Commission majority, the Policy has served as a basis for
162. Id. at 56,078.
163. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,078.
164. Id. at 56,079 ("Injury exists if consumers would have chosen differently but for the
[dleception") (emphasis added).
165. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
166. A standard for materiality that would require a showing that a consumer purchased a
product because of the deceptive representation necessarily invokes a showing of causation or
reliance thereon.
167. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,084 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, dissenting).
168. Id.
169. This possibility is suggested most vividly in Commissioner Pertschuk's dissent against
the Policy. See supra notes 159, 161.
170. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 164.
172. Much deception occurs because consumers are unreasonable in their expectations. See
supra note 140 (Commissioner Pertschuk discussing the value of a less-than-reasonable consumer
standard).
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substantial alterations in the law of deception. Particularly, the "likely to
deceive" standard has watered down the enforcement of deception. The
Commission minority, on the other hand, has refused to accept the legitimacy
of the Policy. The minority doubts the Commission's authority to issue the
Policy. The Commission majority's decision to adopt the new definition
without hearings did not allow public scrutiny and thereby fueled doubts
about the genuineness of the Commission's objectives.173
The dissension in the Commission was highlighted in its fractured decision
in Cliffdale Association, 74 which was the first of four Commission cases
decided under the Policy. In Cliffdale Association, an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) ordered the respondent to "cease and desist" from making
deceptive representations concerning a gas saving automotive accessory. 75
The majority affirmed the decision, but disapproved of the ALJ's use of
the pre-Policy legal standard of deception. 76 Chairman Miller characterized
the use of the old standard as "circular and therefore inadequate."', 77 The
Commission majority used the Cliffdale Association case as an opporturiity
to affirm the authority of the new Policy:
Consistent with its Policy Statement on Deception, issued on October 14,
1983, the Commission will find an act or practice deceptive if, first, there
is a representation, omission, or practice that, second, is likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and third, the rep-
resentation, omission, or practice is material.-
173. Chairman Miller claimed that the Policy was a simple restatement of the law of deception:
We have therefore reviewed the decided cases to synthesize the most important
principles of general applicability. We have attempted to provide a concrete indi-
cation of the manner in which the Commission will enforce its deception mandate.
In so doing, we intend to address the concerns that have been raised about the
meaning of deception, and thereby attempt to provide a greater sense of certainty
as to how the concept will be applied.
Policy, supra note 3, at 56,071.
174. 3 TRADE REO. REP. (CCH) 22,137, at 22,947-64 (FTC Mar. 23, 1984).
175. Id. at 22,954. The respondent marketed a gasoline saving device known as the "Ball-
Matic Gas Save Valve." Id. at 22,948. The company's representations were alleged to be
deceptive about the device's value and performance. Id. These allegations against the company
broke down into four general areas:
I) claims relating to the performance of the "Ball-Matic Gas Save Valve,"
2) claims that competent scientific tests supported respondent's claims,
3) the use of consumer endorsements, and
4) respondent lacked a reasonable basis for making the performance claims.
Id. at 22,948-49.
176. Id. at 22,949-50. The AU stated that "any advertising that has the tendency and
capacity to mislead or deceive a prospective purchaser is an unfair and deceptive practice which
violates the Federal Trade Commission Act." Id. at 22,949.
177. Id. at 22,949. The majority in Cliffdale Assoc. rejected the ALl's use of the traditional
legal standard of deception. The majority stated:
We find this approach to deception and violations of Section 5 [15 U.S.C. § 45
(1982)] to be circular and therefore inadequate to provide guidance on how a
deception claim should be analyzed. Accordingly, we believe it appropriate for the
Commission to articulate a clear and understandable standard for deception.
Id.
178. In addition, the majority stated: "These elements articulated the factors actually used
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Commissioners Bailey and Pertschuk filed vigorous dissents. 79 They not only
challeged the legality of the Policy directly, 80 but they also strongly rejected
the Policy definition of deception as a mandatory standard. 8' They also
stated that the Policy's reformulation of the law was confusing and unwar-
ranted.8 2
Thompson Medical Co. 3 was the second Commission opinion issued under
the Policy. In Thompson Medical, a pharmaceutical manufacturer marketed
its topical cream rub, "Aspercreme," as an effective drug for the relief of
in most earlier Commission cases identifying whether or not an act or practice was deceptive,
even though the language used in those cases was often couched in such terms as 'a tendency
and capacity to deceive."' Id. at 23,949
179. Id. at 22,954-61 (Pertschuk and Bailey, Comm'rs, dissenting).
180. Bailey and Pertschuk reiterated their strong disagreement with the majority's purported
restatement as an accurate reflection of deception case law. Id. at 22,954-61 (Pertschuk and
Bailey, Comm'rs, dissenting). Further, they argued that the Policy is not binding upon the
Commission or courts as legal precedent. They supported their assertions with the same
arguments that they presented in their respective dissents to the Policy. See supra notes 90-94
and accompanying text.
181. Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH), 22,137, at 22,954 (Pertschuk,
Comm'r, dissenting). Commissioner Pertschuk stated that "since the validity of the bare majority
vote on the Statement is open to question, apparently the new majority feels compelled to
establish the Statement's legitimacy now by jumping this case through the hoops of its analytical
framework for deception cases, regardless of how unhelpful that exercise may be." Id.
182. Id. at 22,963 (Commissioner Bailey, dissenting). Commissioner Bailey, as well Com-
missioner Pertschuk, concurred fully in the majority's findings of liability. Id. at 22,958 (Bailey,
Comm'r, dissenting); id. at 22,954 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, dissenting). The dissenters, however,
disassociated themselves "from the confusing and wholly unorthodox reformulation of the
traditional test for finding deception, which has been announced in this opinion as the relevant
legal standard." Id. at 22,958 (Bailey, Comm'r, dissenting). Commissioner Bailey also expressed
her concern about the impact that the Cliffdale opinion will have on future FTC cases:
The effort to apply the new deception standard to the instant case is, I believe, a
particularly confusing and profitless effort. As I noted at the outset, this case is
unusually clearcut, involving as it does a variety of false performance claims, the
meaning of which can be readily discerned from an examination of respondents'
advertisements and the record generally. Nevertheless, the opinion strains valiantly
at several junctures to introduce specific findings concerning the "reasonableness"
of consumer behavior and the presence of materiality or "detriment" in Cliffdale.
Again, I have no quarrel with the conclusions reached in this case, but analyzing
it by applying these new elements is a wholly unnecessary exercise which demon-
strates, I fear, the serious evidentiary difficulties and the exercise of even greater
analytical gymnastics that will be necessary in future, more complicated Commission
cases ....
Rather than clarifying the law of deception, the opinion attempts to write new
law which is destined to confound its readers. If applied literally, the new three
part definition could narrow the Commission's authority to prosecute a range of
dishonest or deceptive conduct, while creating complications and uncertainty about
the cases we do bring.
Id. at 22,963 (Bailey, Comm'r, dissenting).
183. Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,214, at 23,141-72 (FTC
Nov. 23, 1984).
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minor arthritis symptoms.1 14 The respondent appealed from the AL's finding
of deception: 5 Commissioner Douglas's majority opinion applied the stand-
ard of deception delineated in the Policy and affirmed the ALJ's finding.8 6
Commissioner Douglas examined "whether or not [respondent's] claims were
likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances."'8 s7
In a brief notation, Commissioner Bailey concurred that the respondent's
practices were deceptive,'88 but distanced herself from the Policy's definition
of deception. 89
In International Harvester Co.,'90 a manufacturer of farm equipment sold
tractors whose engines tended to geyser.' 9' Harvester admitted that it knew
about the problem when the tractors were sold.1 92 The issue before the ALJ
184. Id. at 23,142. The complaint filed against the Thompson Medical Company included
the following alleged deceptive representations:
- Aspercreme contains aspirin.
- Aspercreme is a recently discovered or developed drug product.
- Valid studies have scientifically proven that Aspercreme is more effective than
orally-ingested aspirin for the relief of arthritis, rheumatic conditions, and their
symptoms.
- Aspercreme is an effective drug for the relief of minor arthritis and its symptoms.
- Aspercreme is as effective a drug as orally-ingested aspirin for the relief of
minor arthritis and its symptoms.
- Aspercreme is a more effective drug than orally-ingested aspirin for the relief
of minor arthritis and its symptoms.
- Aspercreme is an effective drug for the relief of rheumatic conditions and their
symptoms.
- Aspercreme acts by directly penetrating through the skin to the site of the
arthritic disorder.
- The use of Aspercreme will result in no side effects.
Id. at 23,142.
185. Id. The ALJ found against Thompson on all charges except those that related to claims
that Aspercreme had no side effects. The ALJ's order required Thompson to have a reasonable
basis for claims that its product was effective for the relief of symptoms of musculoskeletal
disorders. His order further prohibited Thompson from "(1) using the brand name 'Aspercreme'
unless it is accompanied by a disclosure that the product does not contain aspirin; (2) representing
that a product is new if it has been generally available for purchase in the United States for
more than one year; and (3) misrepresenting any test or study." Id.
186. Id. at 23,142-43.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 23,143 n.4.
189. Id. No formal dissent was filed in the Thompson opinion. The only indication of
dissension was mentioned by the majority in a footnote. Id. at 23,143 n.4.
190. International Harvester Co., 3 TPADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,217, at 23,174-93 (FTC Dec.
21, 1984).
191. Id. at 23,174-77. Fuel geysering is the forceful ejection of hot fuel through a loosened
gas cap. The complaint filed against International Harvester alleged that: 1) fuel geysering
could result in serious fires, and sometimes injure the tractor operator; 2) that Harvester was
aware of this fact for many years; 3) that Harvester did not adequately notify its customers of
the danger; and 4) that the tractor operators therefore took inadequate measures to protect
themselves. Id. at 23,174-75.
192. Harvester manufactured and sold gasoline-powered tractors from 1939 to 1978. By
approximately 1963, Harvester was aware that its gasoline-powered tractors were subject to fuel
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was whether Harvester's failure to warn owners and potential buyers of the
geysering problem constituted an unfair' 93 or deceptive practice under section
five of the FTC Act.194 The AU found that the repondent's failure to warn
about the hazards of fuel geysering was a form of deception because the
omission improperly implied that the tractors were fit for their ordinary
use. 95 The AU also found that the failure to warn was unfair because
consumers were subjected to a risk of harm that they reasonably could not
have avoided.'96
The Commission majority, which termed the respondent's failure to warn
a "pure omission,' ' 97 based its decision solely on unfairness, and omitted
the deception claim.198 Commissioner Bailey dissented from the Commission
geysering. International Harvester also knew that many tractor operators were unaware of this
hazard, and that some operators had been seriously injured, or even killed, as a result. Id. at
23,175-77.
193. Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits unfair, as well as deceptive, acts or practices. 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) ("unfair or deceptive acts or practices . . .are declared unlawful"). During
the past five years, the Commission has attempted to clarify what it considers an "unfair act
or practice." In 1980, the Commission prepared a formal policy statement describing its
jurisdiction over unfair practices. Letter from the Federal Trade Commission to Senators
Wendell Ford and John Danforth, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,421 (Dec. 17, 1980). In this
policy statement, the Commission stated that most unfairness cases would be brought under a
consumer injury theory. According to the policy statement, an actionable consumer injury must
be: (I) substantial; (2) more harmful than any offsetting consumer or competitive benefits that
the practice produces; and (3) one which consumers reasonably could not have avoided. Some
commentators have interpreted the Commission's policy statement on unfairness as applying a
general balancing of interests, and not a bright line economic rule. See Averitt, The Meaning
of "Unfair Acts or Practices in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 GEo. L.J.
225 (1981).
194. International Harvester Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,217, at 23,174 (FTC
Dec. 21, 1984).
195. Id. Looking to prior Commission case law under the FTC Act, the ALJ concluded:
"Even where no explicit safety claim has been made, as in this case, the Commission has found
that the failure to disclose such a hidden, or unknown, hazard is a deceptive practice." Id. at
23,187. The ALJ also found that "[iln selling its tractors, respondent gives an implied warranty
that it is safe to use for its intended use, save any obvious or well-known defects or hazards."
Id. The ALJ concluded that the respondent had a continuing duty to disclose adequately that
fuel geysering constituted a safety hazard, and that this failure constituted a deceptive practice.
Id.
196. Id. at 23,178.
197. The failure to disclose material facts, whether in the context of a truthful representation
or a completely omitted fact, has been acknowledged by the Commission to be an important
part of the law of deception. See supra note 25. This principle is codified in § 15 of the FTC
Act, which expressly provides that when the Commission determines whether an advertisement
for food, drug, device, or cosmetic is misleading in a material respect, the Commission shall
take into account "the extent to which the advertisement fails to reveal facts material in light
of such representations or material with respect to consequences which may result from the use
of the commodity. " 15 U.S.C § 55 (emphasis added).
198. International Harvester Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,217, at 23,186-87 (FTC
Dec. 21, 1984). The Commission resolved the International Harvester case by holding that
Harvester's failure to disclose the potential of fuel geysering, while unfair, was not deceptive.
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majority.199 Although Bailey agreed that Harvester's failure to warn was an
unfair practice, 200 she dissented from the majority opinion because she
believed that the respondent's conduct was also deceptive. 01 Bailey argued
that the majority ignored established deception precedent, and that the
majority's findings were unfounded even under the Policy's standards. 202
Also, she expressed concern about the precedential value of the opinion.
Bailey feared that the effect of the Harvester opinion would be to limit
future investigations of "hazardous commodities" advertising under a de-
ception theory. 203 According to Commissioner Bailey, the majority presented
"no sound legal or policy reasons to justify its detour from the Commission's
traditional law of deception. 2 0 4
The court stated:
We have decided that such omissions should be judged as cases of possible deception.
Since pure omissions do not most probably reflect deliberate acts on the part of
the sellers, we cannot be confident, without a cost-benefit analysis, that a Com-
mission action would do more good than harm. Yet a cost-benefit analysis is
required only under an unfairness and not under a deception approach. We will
therefore treat these matters in unfairness terms in order to ensure that such analysis
is made. In so deciding we hope to have added something further to the clarity and
rigor of our statute, so that decisions on the merits may henceforth be made and
predicted with greater precision.
Id.
199. Id. at 23,187-93 (Bailey, Comm'r, dissenting).
200. Id. at 23,187 (Bailey, Comm'r, disserting). Commissioner Bailey concurred in the
majority's findings that Harvester's conduct constituted an unfair act or practice according to
the standards set forth in the Commission's 1980 policy statement on unfairness. See supra
note 193.
201. International Harvester Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,217, at 23,187 (FTC
Dec. 21, 1984). The following passage is indicative of Commissioner Bailey's deception analysis
in International Harvester:
In view of the cumulative knowledge Harvester possessed concerning the circum-
stances which could lead to geysering and the substantial risk or injury if it occurred,
as well as the almost complete lack of information available to tractor operators
about this possibility, I believe it is patent that Harvester's unwillingness or delay
in disclosing this potential hazard had the tendency to deceive numerous tractor
operators in a highly material respect. Such conduct is, by definition, deceptive
under Section 5.
Id. at 23,190.
202. Id. at 23,192.
203. Id. Commissioner Bailey believes that the Harvester decision will add confusion to the
status of the law of deception. Bailey stated:
Contrary to the Commission's conclusory statements in this opinion, the FTC's
cautious and consistent approach to pure omissions has provided substantial guid-
ance both to the Commission in terms of following its own precedent and to sellers
who seek to comply with the law by looking to such precedent. Changing the law
at this juncture will only inject immediate confusion as to the status of the law of
deception generally in cases of seller silence, without affording any additional long-
term certainty.
Id. at 23,193.
204. Id. at 23,193.
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Finally, in Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 20 5 the Commission found that three
Texas land-development companies misrepresented the value of the land that
they sold, and that the companies failed to disclose material facts about the
land. 206 Commission Bailey wrote an opinion for a unanimous Commission
that affirmed that the realtors's practices were deceptive. 0 7 Although Com-
missioner Bailey used the standard for deception set forth in the Policy,
208
she stated separately in a footnote that she still does not endorse the use of
this standard.2 09 Instead, Commissioner Bailey would retain the pre-policy
standard of deception, which states that an act or practice is deceptive if it
has "the tendency or capacity to mislead a substantial number of consumers
in a material way."1
210
The dissenter's resistance to the Policy in all four cases can be traced in
part to the Commission's failure to adopt its definition through legally
prescribed means.2" The Commission could have adopted the Policy through
trade agency rules, which would have given the Policy definition of deception
the authority of law."' Such regulations must be adopted according to
Administrative Procedure Act and FTC Act guidelines.213 The Commission
could also have adopted the new deception standards through the course of
adjudication. In an adjudication, at least, some interested parties would have
been permitted to submit testimony on behalf of or against the proposed
standard. 2 4 Finally, the Commission could have lobbied Congress to amend
the FTC Act's definition of deception."
205. Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,226, at 23,218-65 (FTC
Jan. 15, 1985).
206. Id. at 23,218. The Commission's complaint alleged that respondents' land sale activities
violated § 5 of the FTC Act. The following is a summary of the three count complaint. The
complaint alleged that respondents:
(1) misrepresented that the parcels sold ... were good investments involving little
or no financial risk and failed to disclose material information regarding their
financial risk;
(2) misrepresented that the properties were suitable for use as homesites, farms,
and ranches and failed to disclose material facts regarding the suitability of the
properties for those uses; and
(3) sold parcels that were of little or no value and unfairly retained the proceeds
from the sales.
Id. at 23,220.
207. The Commission voted 3 to 0 to issue the decision. Commissioners Terry Calvani and
Mary L. Azcuenaga did not participate. Id. at 23,218.
208. The deception standard used by Commissioner Bailey in Southwest Sunsites, Inc., stated
that "an act or practice is deceptive if it consists of a representation, omission or practice that
is both material and likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances."
Id. at 23,247.
209. Id. at 23,247 n.79.
210. Id. Commissioner Bailey believed that the respondents' practices were deceptive regard-
less of the standard of deception applied.
211. See supra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
212. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 553 (1982).
213. See supra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 63-65.
215. See supra note 84 (chronicling Chairman Miller's attempts to get a statutory definition).
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Unfortunately, the Commission did not pursue these legitimate routes to
reform its deception enforcement practices. The Commission acted beyond
its authority to adopt a new definition of deception as a Commission
standard. The Commission thereby cast into doubt the legitimacy of the
Policy.
The Policy also may impose substantial costs on consumers. Because the
Policy weakens the standards for deception, companies will be freer to make
marginally deceptive claims with impunity. If an advertisement is objectively
likely to deceive consumers, and if there is no extrinsic evidence that the
advertisement is deceptive, then the Commission may use the Policy to
disregard complaints about those advertisements. The Policy may be inter-
preted in novel ways by future Commissions to further narrow Commission
authority to regulate deceptive advertising. 16
CONCLUSION
Chairman Miller's purported restatement of deception is a thorough re-
vision of that field of regulation. The Policy's inaccurate restatement of
deception law, along with the controversial procedure undertaken by the
Commission to adopt the Policy, creates uncertainty regarding the legitimacy
of the Policy. The only thing definite about the Policy is that it creates
unparalleled confusion in the law of deception. Already, this confusion has
inspired dissension in four Commission adjudications. The Commission and
enforcing courts have been left with the task of enforcing deception standards
that vary widely from accepted case law principles. Ironically, Chairman
Miller's Policy fails to accomplish the very purpose for which it was con-
ceived: "to provide a greater sense of certainty as to how the concept will
be applied."2 '7
Dale Pollak & Bruce Teichner
216. One solution to decreasing federal authority in the deception area is to increase state
regulation. All 50 states and the District of Columbia have enacted some type of statute
regulating deceptive acts and practices. See S. SHELDON & G. ZWEIBEL, SURVEY OF CONSUMER
FRAUD LAW 121-22 (1978) (summarizing provisions in 49 states and the District of Columbia).
In 1981, Alabama became the 50th state to enact its own version of the FTC Act. See ALA.
CODE §§ 8-19-1 to -15 (Supp. 1983). On the other hand, many of these state statutes parallel
the FTC Act, and many state courts have drawn on federal jurisprudence in deciding lawsuits
brought pursuant to these statutes. It is therefore possible that the states will adopt the policy
as well. See Leaffer & Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices:
The Private Uses of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH L. REV. 521,
533 (1980). See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110(B) (1983). The Connecticut statute states:
It is the intent of the legislature that in construing subsection (A) of this section
(which provides that "no person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce,")
the Commissioner (of Consumer Protection) and the court of this State shall be
guided by interpretations given by the FTC and the Federal courts to Section 5(A)(1)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act 115 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)] as from time to time
amended.
Id.
217. Policy, supra note 3, at 56,071.
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